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1. Introduction
Following numerous reforms of fiscal governance in the eurozone since 2011, the year 2016 saw 
another important innovation: the founding of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) with the selection 
and appointment of its five members. The EFB was one of the elements envisaged by the Five Pre-
sidents’ Report in June 2015 (Juncker et al., 2015) for a future “Fiscal Union”. It is the only element 
among those in the report to have been established within such a remarkably short time span. The 
decision to create this new institution was taken by the European Commission (EC) in October 
20151. The Board began operating shortly after its members were appointed in October 2016.
The EFB’s broad mandate includes the following main tasks (European Commission, 2015, Article 2):
1.  To evaluate the implementation of the European Fiscal Framework2:
 –  In particular, to ensure horizontal consistency of decisions with respect to budget surveil-
lance and non-compliance with fiscal rules, to pinpoint unequal treatment in cases of vio-
lations of the Framework, and to make suggestions for the future evolution of the Framework.
2. To advise the Commission:
 –  On the actual and prospective fiscal stance appropriate on both the national level and the 
eurozone as a whole.
3. To cooperate with national fiscal councils:
 –  Through the exchange of best practices and through facilitating common understanding on 
matters related to the fiscal rules of the EU.
Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Eckhard Janeba and participants of the SEEK-ENBI Workshop “Fiscal Governance in 
the Eurozone: The Role of Rules, Fiscal Boards and Other Policy Innovations” in ZEW Mannheim for their very helpful comments.
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they present.
1  Commission Decision 2015/1937 (European Commission, 2015), amended through Commission Decision 2016/221 with 
respect to Head of Secretariat (European Commission, 2016a)
2  As defined by articles 121 (common and coordinated economic policy), 126 (surveillance and prevention of excessive de-
ficits), and 136 (increased surveillance and coordination within the Euro zone) TFEU.
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The EFB is unique in that it is set up at the supranational level. This is in contrast to the numerous 
independent fiscal councils that have been established at the national level in individual Euro-
pean countries over recent years. Despite this major typological distinction, there are conceptual 
parallels between the EFB and these national councils. In fact, the Five Presidents’ Report points 
to the national councils as examples of how an independent advisory body could be designed at 
the EU level (“it should [...] conform to the same standards of independence”, Juncker et al. 2015, 
Annex 3).
The number of countries with fiscal councils has increased from 1 in 1945 to 12 in 2007 and 37 
in 2015 (Debrun, et al. 2017). Increasingly, these independent fiscal watchdogs are established 
to complement fiscal rules, and often have the explicit mandate to monitor compliance with these 
rules. By the end of 2015, only 3 countries – Canada, South Korea, and South Africa – had a fiscal 
council but no fiscal policy rules. The need for countries to reaffirm their commitment to fiscal 
responsibility in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-9 offers a partial explanation 
for the rise in fiscal councils worldwide. In the EU, the Fiscal Compact requires assigning “inde-
pendent bodies” at the national level (although not necessarily to a new fiscal council) with the 
task of monitoring compliance with the deficit rules and assessing the macroeconomic and bud-
getary forecasts underlying commitments under the rule (TSCG, 2012, Article 3). 
The basic rationale of councils in any federal context is to bring more political independence and 
unbiased (academic) expertise into budgetary debates. Contrary to monetary policy where inde-
pendent central banks have the executive power to make decisions on monetary policy, fiscal 
councils lack this kind of decision power. However, a successful council can influence fiscal out-
comes by providing parliaments, governments and the general public with reliable information 
on the budgetary situation, its prospects, and the potential impact of certain policy initiatives.
While governments are becoming increasingly familiar with the growing number of councils at the 
national level, the EFB is nonetheless unique given the multi-level context of its tasks. Unlike na-
tional councils, it does not directly address budgetary decision makers. Instead, its main task is 
to advise the European Commission on its responsibility to implement the European fiscal frame-
work. Whereas a national council typically serves as the immediate watchdog for the budgetary 
actors (i.e. the national parliament and government), the EFB is rather a “watchdog for another 
watchdog,” although the Commission is admittedly a special watchdog, one that can bite through 
enforcement powers.
Given this peculiar role in the universe of fiscal councils, the EFB is expected to support the Com-
mission in its multilateral fiscal surveillance of Member States and their budgetary policy. One 
obvious interpretation is that this board of experts shall serve as a neutral and well-informed mo-
nitor of the Commission to dispel perceptions or deter the temptation to let political motivations 
taint its even-handedness in implementing the EU-wide fiscal framework.
One striking feature (and a major difference compared to a typical national fiscal council) is that 
the EFB’s remit does not cover the EU budget itself. There is indeed no mandate to assess fiscal 
decisions made by the EU budgetary authorities themselves (e.g. on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework, the annual EU budget or other European level fiscal instruments like the European 
Stability Mechanism or the growing number of budgetary entities like the EFSI or the new trust 
funds in the context of asylum and refugee policies).
In light of this unusual setting, we explore the prospective effectiveness of the EFB and propose 
potential avenues for its further improvement. Our point of reference is a set of principles and 
best practices for independent fiscal institutions as they have emerged in the literature on nati-
3  For instance Debrun et al. (2013) or von Trapp, Lienert and Wehner (2015).
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onal councils.³ Before taking a thorough look at the setup of the EFB we briefly summarise the 
lessons from the scholarly literature on the basic rationale of fiscal councils and their potential 
main channels of impact. Although that recent literature has been inspired by the post-crisis pro-
liferation of national fiscal councils, it is the natural starting point.
2. Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Impact
As early as 1788, James Madison, the 4th President of the United States, famously observed: 
“A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experi-
ence has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” In today’s words, Madison was 
warning that democratic accountability was often not enough to effectively limit policymakers’ 
budgetary discretion in democracies (see, e.g., Fatás et al., 2003). Historically, two institutional 
solutions – or “auxiliary precautions’ – have been proposed to discourage the misuse of fiscal 
policy discretion: i) budgetary rules, such as general procedural rules or numerical rules for defi-
cits or debt brakes, or ii) independent fiscal institutions with certain budgetary responsibilities 
or at least oversight duties. 
The obvious weakness of a rule is that even in its most sophisticated form, it will hardly be able 
to anticipate all contingencies or offer guidance on the best possible fiscal stance. Unlike mon-
etary policy, fiscal policy is too complex to be boiled down to simple numerical rules (Debrun, 
Hauner and Kumar, 2009). And even though simple “Taylor-rules” have been advocated in the 
monetary realm, they have never been used as a tool to tie the hands of policymakers. Conse-
quently, a dilemma emerges: Discretion is indispensable and at the same time prone to myopic 
political abuse. Well-designed independent fiscal institutions could alleviate this dilemma. For 
a discussion on the role of fiscal councils in easing several tradeoffs in fiscal rules design see 
Research Note 6.3.
Since the mid-1990s, difficulties with designing and implementing fiscal policy rules have led 
economists to think about how non-partisan fiscal watchdogs could affect policymakers’ incen-
tives in a more credible and effective way than through arbitrary and inflexible caps on deficits, 
debts or other budgetary aggregates. By influencing the public debate on fiscal policy through 
independent assessments, forecasts, and opinions, fiscal councils could better inform voters on 
the short-term and long-term effects of given policy decisions, helping them support desirable 
options and oppose undesirable ones (Kopits 2013; Debrun et al. 2013). Although fiscal watch-
dogs would not be expected to bite, their barking in the face of bad fiscal policy could be suffici-
ently loud to discourage potentially harmful measures. Unlike rigid fiscal rules, analysis from 
fiscal councils could lead to more adequate policy responses in virtually any circumstances while 
preserving confidence in long-term sustainability. The argument is of course particularly relevant 
when tail risks disrupting almost any fiscal rule materialise, as occurred in 2008. 
While this line of arguments could help explain the increased appetite for independent fiscal 
institutions after the global financial crisis, fiscal councils share with fiscal rules a vulnerability 
to governments’ fickle incentives to take them seriously. Unlike independent central banks, 
fiscal councils do not have the power to set a specific instrument to fulfil a certain mandate for 
which they can be held directly accountable. Fiscal policy discussions are inherently less consen-
sual, and more prone to ideological pronouncements than monetary policy, making open 
conflicts between a watchdog and its political master more likely. In addition, fiscal councils do 
4  In the UK, for instance, projections of the Office for Budget Responsibility are used in the budget.
5  The most extreme version is assigning veto power to a fiscal council. Currently, only the mandate of the Hungarian fiscal council  
 involves this formal mandate.
6  For instance, a fiscal council might play an important role in triggering escape clauses.
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not have the financial independence that comes with the power to conduct monetary policy. 
Politically motivated threats to their capacity to operate or even to their existence are a priori 
more credible and more likely to materialise than in the case of central banks. Experience 
confirms that public conflicts, including sometimes retaliatory budget cuts, can significantly 
undermine the capacity of a council to influence the public debate on fiscal policy. 
The above comparison with independent central banks shows the importance of distinguishing 
between two types of independent fiscal institutions commonly discussed in the economic 
literature (Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 2009): While an “independent fiscal authority” has de-
cision power similar to that of independent central banks, a “fiscal council”, in contrast, lacks 
any executive budgetary authority. The fiscal council is limited to advisory and oversight roles in 
which it provides independent analysis and in some cases forecasts and opinions. Independent 
fiscal authorities that can make binding decisions, for instance, on debt, deficit or expenditures 
have simply never existed barring post-conflict situations characterised by the absence of func-
tional political institutions. From a normative perspective, the public finance literature is also 
highly sceptical whether this infringement on parliamentary prerogative can be justified on nor-
mative grounds (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 2009). In some mostly 
isolated cases, however, fiscal councils can be directly integrated into the budget process, for 
example, to make macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts,⁴  to slow down or halt the budget 
process,⁵ to make decisions related to fiscal rules,⁶  and to set deficit targets⁷.  Apart from these 
rare examples of rather direct (“biting”) influence, fiscal councils predominantly influence bud-
getary outcomes through indirect (“barking”) channels of impact.
The most important indirect channels involve:
–   Better fiscal analysis (research) and identification of risks: The mere presence of a 
well-designed council can significantly increase the quality of publicly available fiscal ana- 
lysis. Moreover, policy proposals might be better prepared if the ministry knows in 
advance that major reforms will be cross-checked by the fiscal council. Regular policy 
surveillance by international monitoring institutions (such as the EC, the IMF or the 
OECD) might also benefit from the analysis carried out by the independent fiscal institutions. 
The importance of credible and evidence-based advice in fiscal policy is highlighted by 
Research Note 6.2 on the example of estimated fiscal multipliers. As detailed in the note, this 
central parameter in the design of fiscal policy has a very wide range and may be biased 
towards researcher-specific preferences.
–  Overcoming information asymmetries: As described by Debrun and Kinda (forthcoming) and 
Beetsma and Debrun (2016), politicians deciding on the budget may have disincentives to 
provide voters with full information on the actual fiscal environment (e.g. growth), the state 
of the public sector balance sheet, the risks surrounding it (e.g. hidden debt) and its prospects 
(both short-term budgetary forecasts and long-term sustainability issues). By concealing such 
information, politicians can gain more leeway for a myopic agenda or obscure their own lack 
of effort or ability. Furthermore, it is often hard for voters to distinguish between bad luck and 
bad policies or between good luck and good policies. In line with this view, fiscal councils can 
mitigate this asymmetry of information and provide the media, voters or other players (e.g. the 
political opposition) with unbiased information conducive to a more substantive public debate. 
For instance, a council may detect over-optimistic growth and revenue projections or reveal the 
true structural current budgetary situation, reducing the risk of pointless and paralysing argu-
ments about numbers.
7   A somewhat weaker integration of fiscal councils in this respect is present in some countries (e.g., Ireland), where the fiscal  
 council has to judge the appropriateness of the current fiscal stance.
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–   “Comply or explain” principle: This principle can ensure more robust and coherent policy 
making. When this principle is applied, governments cannot simply ignore the opinions of 
fiscal councils. Instead, they either have to comply with the propositions made by the fiscal 
council, or publicly justify why they are not implementing them or are pursuing a different 
policy measure from those initially suggested by the fiscal council. In order to maximise the 
impact of this principle, it is crucial to set a legally binding time frame within which a govern-
ment has to explain why it has disregarded suggestions made by the fiscal council. 
So far, only a few studies have assessed the aggregate effectiveness of fiscal councils in impro-
ving budgetary prudence. As described in Table 1, these studies present a mixed picture. For 
example, the available evidence points to a reduced bias in forecasting on the part of govern-
ments when fiscal councils are present, but a direct link between the existence of councils and 
fiscal aggregates cannot be substantiated. 
An ongoing ZEW study, summarised in Research Note 6.1, explores the interplay between fiscal 
councils and fiscal rules when the former has the explicit mandate to monitor fiscal rules. The 
results indicate that fiscal councils with a mandate to monitor the adherence to fiscal rules, on 
average, do not strengthen the impact of the latter when looking at the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. On the other hand, the study provides evidence for reduced yield spreads on 
long-term government bonds if fiscal rules are supported by fiscal councils with a mandate to 
monitor the former.
Overall, the existing literature paints a mildly optimistic picture. Obtained empirical estimates 
are in line with the indirect channel of impact through which fiscal councils can help reduce 
information asymmetries and in so doing contribute to fiscal decisions more in line with sound 
public finances. Such an effective impact, however, will depend greatly on the details of the ins-
titutional set-up of fiscal councils, a point discussed more in detail in the following section.
Table 1: Summary of empirical papers on the effectiveness of fiscal councils
Study Sample Method Result
Effects on fiscal aggregates
Debrun & Kumar 
(2007)
EU-15 (excl. LUX), 
1990-2004 Dynamic panel estimation
Negative and statistically significant 
effect of fiscal councils on the cycli-
cally-adjusted primary balance
Debrun, Gérard & 
Harris (2017)
7 EU Member 
States,⁸   
2003-2010
Least-squares dummy  
variables approach and 
pooled OLS
A stronger media presence of the  
fiscal council is associated with a 
larger planned change in the cycli-
cally adjusted balance
Nerlich & Reuter 
(2013) EU-27, 1990-2012
Dynamic panel estimation 
using bias corrected least 
squares dummy variables 
approach
Evidence for an improved balance as 
well as reduced expenditures when 
fiscal rules are supported by fiscal 
councils. This effect is more pro-
nounced with the increasing inde-
pendence of councils with respect to 
resources and staffing decisions.
8  AUT, BEL, DEU, DNK, NLD, SVN,SWE.
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3. Principles for Independent Fiscal Councils
Experience with national fiscal councils and their particular strengths and weaknesses has led 
to an understanding of the importance of specific design features of fiscal councils (see Calmfors 
and Wren-Lewis, 2011; Debrun et al., 2013; Beetsma and Debrun, 2016; Horvath, 2017). These 
lessons have been condensed most prominently in the OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal 
Institutions (IFI), adopted by the OECD Council in February 2014 (for details see von Trapp, 
Lienert and Wehner, 2015).
Assessing the effectiveness of different national councils in light of these criteria reveals great 
heterogeneity. Looking at both pre-crisis fiscal councils as well as those induced by the Fiscal 
Compact reveals substantial differences with respect to their remit as well as organisational struc-
ture. While the Fiscal Compact only required the formal establishment of a fiscal council, the 
treaty gave leeway for Member States with respect to details of their institutional design. By the 
same token, this also applies to purely home-grown councils established prior to the crisis. This 
leeway in the institutional design of councils, however, can have direct repercussions on their 
potential effectiveness. Figure 1 summarises these potential repercussions by ranking national 
councils according to their aggregate scrutiny effectiveness based on seven design features.
Study Sample Method Result
Maltritz & Wüste 
(2015) EU-27, 1991-2011
Dynamic estimation of  
repeated cross-sections
Positive and statistically significant 
effect on the primary balance of the 
interaction effect between fiscal rules 
and fiscal councils. Conditional  
effects for both rules and councils are 
positive and statistically significant
Debrun & Kinda 
(forthcoming)
58 (advanced 
and emerging 
countries), 
1990-2011
Dynamic panel estimation 
using bias corrected least 
squares dummy variables 
approach
Overall, no statistically significant ef-
fect of fiscal councils on the primary 
balance. However, individual proper-
ties such as the monitoring of fiscal 
rules, costing of policy measures, or 
a strong media impact exert a posi-
tive and statistically significant im-
pact on the primary balance.
Effects on forecasting error
Frankel & Schreger 
(2013)
17 European 
countries,⁹ 
1999-2011
Repeated cross-section  
estimation
Evidence for reduced budget balance 
forecast errors when fiscal councils 
are present
Gilbert & de Jong 
(2014) EU-27, 2001-2012
Probit 2SLS IV approach for 
the probability to pass the 
3% threshold of the SGP
Reduced upward bias in European 
Commission’s fiscal forecasts if a  
national fiscal council is present
Debrun & Kinda 
(forthcoming)
26 European 
countries
Panel estimation including 
time fixed effects
Forecast error in primary balance is 
reduced when a fiscal council is pre-
sent, or has a high media presence, 
or monitors fiscal rules
Source: Own compilation.
9  AUT, BEL, CHE, DNK, FIN, FRA, ESP, GBR, GRC, IRL, ITA, LUX, NLD, NOR, PRT.
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Figure 1  Ranking of fiscal councils according to aggregate scrutiny effectiveness
 
Notes: The index is a weighted average of 7 sub-categories (where the first five and the last two get a weight of 0.75 and 0.25, respectively)  
and can range from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest effectiveness). Source: Horvath (2017).
The OECD Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions (IFI) involve:
–   Local ownership: An IFI requires ownership, commitment, and consensus across the political 
spectrum in the respective jurisdiction. For that purpose, the institution should be a good fit 
for the environment and not just be an artificial copy of an outside organisation or the result 
of an external obligation.
–   Independence and non-partisanship: Legal and factual independence is a defining characte-
ristic of an IFI intended to enrich the fiscal setting as a depoliticised institution. The selection 
of its members based on professional merit and competence supports the council’s indepen-
dence. Term lengths should be independent from an electoral cycle with clear criteria for 
dismissal. Ideally, the leadership of an IFI should have full freedom to hire its staff and 
without reference to political affiliation.
–   Mandate: The tasks should be clearly defined in higher-level legislation including the re- 
quired reporting obligations. IFIs should have leeway to provide analyses consistent with the 
mandate on their own initiative. To contribute to an effective reduction of information asym-
metries, a council’s mandate should involve a watchdog function with respect to all sources 
of budgetary opacity like the government’s budgetary forecasts, long-term implicit debt, or 
the costing of policy initiatives.
–   Resources: Even the broadest mandate and a wealth of legal rights cannot make a fiscal coun-
cil influential if it lacks the necessary monetary and human resources. That is why the legal 
provisions always have to be assessed in the light of the institution’s available staff and 
capacities including its access to information. Ideally, a fiscal council would exhibit its own 
independent and non-negotiable line in the budget.
–   Relationship with the legislature: Besides the general public, a council can improve the level of 
information available to budgetary decision makers and also challenge them in hearings or other 
interactions if it has the right or occasion to do so. A habitual or even obligatory reaction (“com-
ply or explain”) from the scrutinised institution to IFI statements would signal a higher impact.
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Lithuania (2015)
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Germany (2010)
France (2013)
Italy (2014)
Austria (2014)
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Slovenia (2009)
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Spain (2014)
Netherlands (1945)
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Access to information
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Reaction from government
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–   Access to information: An effective IFI needs to have access to budgetary information (inclu-
ding methodologies and assumption used) in a timely manner at no cost. This should ideally 
be codified as a legal right of the fiscal council.
–   Transparency: IFI reports and analysis must be published in their own name and be made 
freely available. Release dates of major report should be formally established and correspond 
to the timing of budgetary decisions. 
–   Communications: IFIs must have (and make use of) comprehensive rights and capacities to 
communicate with media, the general public and stakeholders. This also requires the media 
to take notice of the council’s existence and statements. Naturally, new institutions will be at 
a disadvantage compared to institutions with a long tradition.
–  External evaluation: IFIs should develop a mechanism for external evaluation of their work 
e.g. through evaluations of the quality of their analyses. For that purpose, instruments like a 
peer review system or an advisory board can be used.
The relevance and importance of these properties become even more striking when looking at 
national fiscal councils. For instance, the Canadian fiscal council illustrates the risks associated 
with a low level of legal and operational independence from the executive branch, leading to 
political pressure. Following a critical analysis of a government programme, the council faced a 
significant threat of budget cuts. Furthermore, the Canadian fiscal council’s lack of a legal right 
to access information led to a legal battle in federal court to obtain the necessary information 
(Curristine, Harris and Seiwald, 2013).
A regular but well-timed media presence throughout the year is crucial for a successful fiscal coun-
cil. In fact, communication can be an integral part of the mandate of a fiscal council. For instance, 
the Swedish fiscal council is explicitly tasked with explaining the economic foundations of policy 
proposals and their motivations to the public (Curristine, Harris and Seiwald, 2013). The Dutch 
fiscal council has achieved a high media presence by engaging in policy costing. This part of its 
mandate boosts media presence especially in the run up to parliamentary elections when the 
Dutch fiscal council provides costings of the reform proposals put forward by all major electoral 
platforms (Curristine, Harris and Seiwald, 2013). More generally, it is important for an effective 
fiscal council communication to remain focused and predictable. A preannounced schedule of 
communication avoids the risk of a running commentary that fails to add value to the public 
debate, and it mitigates perceptions of politically motivated media interventions.
While the EFB is distinct from most national fiscal councils given its federal nature, it bears some 
resemblance to the Spanish fiscal council, which has the key task of monitoring fiscal discipline 
at all federal levels of government. That said, the EFB remains unique in that it monitors and as-
sists a supranational entity instead of national budgetary authorities. All in all, there is enough 
commonality with national fiscal councils to apply the general principles for IFIs and draw lessons 
from the development and activities of national fiscal councils.
4. The Potential Effectiveness of the EFB
4.1  General considerations
The EFB is conceptually similar to IFIs at the national level in that its role is limited to a monitor-
ing and advisory role. This approach had been made clear in the Five Presidents’ Report: “It should 
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advise, not implement policy. Enforcing the rules should remain the task of the European Com-
mission […]” (Juncker et al., 2015, Annex 3). Consequently, the EFB does not have a say on budge-
tary decisions at the national or European level. Furthermore, it does not have an executive role with 
respect to the application of enforcement rules and sanctions of the Stability Pact. Enforcement 
remains the full responsibility of the European Commission (in its interplay with the Council). 
Yet the EFB is fundamentally different from national fiscal councils because, as discussed above, 
it does not monitor the Commission as a budgetary authority itself but rather as an enforcer of 
the European fiscal framework. Against this background, the establishment of the EFB itself 
increases the complexity of the institutional setup. In the future, national budgetary policy will 
be under the scrutiny of the following authorities:
–  National budgetary authorities (i.e. national parliament and government, court of auditors),
–  National fiscal councils,
–  European Commission and
–  European Fiscal Board.
This enriched set-up creates opportunities and risks.
–   Depoliticisation: European governance has evolved into a highly complex system whose 
details are by no means fully understood by more than a few experts (see Research Note 6.3). 
This leaves the Commission ample room to make decisions that the public can scarcely un-
derstand. The Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker’s ambition to lead a “political Com-
mission” (Juncker, 2015) can be interpreted in this light. In the context of fiscal rules, politi-
cisation is potentially toxic. It might imply pandering to political considerations in the 
interpretation of fiscal rules, effectively disconnecting enforcement from the ultimate objec-
tive of preserving fiscal sustainability throughout the economic and monetary union. Juncker’s 
famous justification for accepting further French delays in consolidation just “because it is 
France” (Guarascio, 2016) illustrates almost to the point of absurdity the perception of un-
desirable discretion on the part of the Commission. Moreover, the fiscal framework has failed 
to avoid pro-cyclical policies and to ensure fiscal sustainability (see Research Note 6.3). In 
this environment, a fiscal council could be an important countermeasure against myopic 
political considerations and could foster more politically neutral and objective long-term sur-
veillance of fiscal policy. 
–  Risk of higher noise-to-signal ratio: Adding another watchdog to an already complex system 
of fiscal governance may not necessarily improve public information. As a new and untested 
institution, the EFB might, at least initially, be perceived as an added source of noise to the 
public debate on budgetary policies in Europe. The EFB’s messages and communication would 
indeed be adding to those of national treasuries and independent national fiscal councils, 
the European Commission, and international organisations (not to mention rating agencies 
and private analysts). In the absence of reasonable ex-ante cooperation among independent 
official bodies commenting on fiscal policy, the risk of cacophony looms large, undermining 
the public’s ability to send the right messages to their policymakers through established 
accountability mechanisms. The risk of a rising noise-to-signal ratio can be mitigated by the 
intrinsic quality of EFB work and by its ability to cooperate with other official institutions by 
providing surveillance on national fiscal policies.
4.2  EFB and OECD principles
Assessing the set-up of the EFB in light of the OECD criteria is difficult. A new institution has no 
track record meaning that, for the time being, any judgment is inevitably speculative in nature. 
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Nevertheless, some cautious first assessments based on the principles described above are pos-
sible (and necessary) already at this early stage of this new institution’s existence.
Local ownership
Ownership does not seem to be a fundamental concern. The EFB has been established following 
the blueprint of the Five Presidents’ Report chaired by the President of the Commission. The pro-
posal has been consensual. The short time-span between the Report and the actual establish-
ment of the EFB is a further indicator that this building block of a Fiscal Union has been one of 
the least controversial ones.
Independence and non-partisanship
Formal independence is guaranteed in the Commission Decision (Article 4): “the members of the 
Board shall act independently and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the Union‘s ins-
titutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private 
body.” All five members are appointed by the Commission on the proposal of the President. This 
strong role of the Commission in member selection is unfortunate given that the Commission is 
the object of the Board’s scrutiny. In the case of three ordinary members, there are consultations 
with national fiscal councils, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup Working Group 
(Article 3). The initial selection of members (see box 1) clearly reflects a great focus on academic 
merit and expertise. The term length of Board members, set at 3 years (with one possible rene-
wal), is fairly short compared to best international practice and well below the 5 year term of the 
Commission. This weakens actual independence further. Another obvious imperfection is the 
Board’s lack of its own staff. The EFB has to rely primarily on the Commission’s staff for its secre-
tariat. This integration of the EFB and its staff into the Commission’s institutional structure might 
reduce its credibility as an independent advisory body (European Central Bank, 2016, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2016).¹⁰  The lack of organic independence is also in stark contrast to most 
of the national councils, which are either stand-alone institutions with functional autonomy and 
formal independence from budgetary authorities or benefit from specific guarantees on their ope-
rational independence if they are embedded in other institutions (executive, parliaments or audit 
courts). Some observers, therefore, classify the EFB as merely an “internal advisory body of the 
Commission” (Claeys et al., 2016, p. 16) rather than an IFI-type institution.
10  Media reports about internal Commission disputes on the choice of a head of the secretariat already suggest political in 
 fighting over the selection of a crucial staff member (Carretta, 2016, Marks and Salt-marsh, 2016).
11   Own compilation. Source of pictures:  
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/graphs/2016-10-20_european_fiscal_board_en.htm
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Box 1  EFB Members 
Chair: Niels Thygesen (Denmark): Professor Emeritus of International Economics at the Universi-
ty of Copenhagen; formerly: Danish Government, OECD, Nationalbank, Danish Economic Council 
(chair), member of Delors Committee.
Roel Beetsma (The Netherlands): Professor at the University of Amsterdam; formerly: University 
of California at Berkeley, University of British Columbia, and DELTA (Paris).
Massimo Bordignon (Italy): Professor of Public Economics at the Catholic University of Milan; 
formerly: International Monetary Fund, Italian Treasury.
Sandrine Duchêne (France): General Secretary of AXA France in charge of audit and compliance; 
formerly: Deputy Director General and Chief Economist of the French Treasury, Adviser to President 
Hollande, Head of the Economic Forecasts Division at INSEE.
Mateusz Szczurek (Poland): former Finance Minister of Poland. PhD University of Sussex. Associ-
ate Director, Lead Regional Economist in EBRD. Chief Economist of ING Poland and ING Group for 
Central Europe and Eastern Europe.
Mandate
The mandate with respect to the European fiscal framework, the national and European fiscal 
stances and the cooperation with national fiscal boards (see introduction) is defined in a Com-
mission Decision, as a legal instrument that, in the hierarchy of norms, does not carry the weight 
of a Regulation and is as such easily reversible. The mandate is broad although it excludes typi-
cal tasks of national fiscal councils (e.g. assessment of draft bills and forecasts, assessment of 
long-term sustainability). However, these exclusions seem appropriate given the specific role of 
the EFB as a watchdog of the Commission in its surveillance role (and not to a budgetary autho-
rity directly). On the other hand, the mandate for analysing and commenting on the “fiscal stance” 
is rather untypical for national councils. 
The “fiscal stance” dimension could potentially conflict with surveillance carried out under the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The former could be interpreted as a discretionary demand manage-
ment approach whereas the latter is a set of (imperfect) operational rules and last-resort ceilings 
that aim to reconcile long-run sustainability and countercyclical considerations. Arguably, the 
recent increasingly politicised implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact blurs the distinc-
tion between the two. The mandate to advise on the fiscal stance is an opportunity to restore the 
distinction and revert to a transparent, rules-based evaluation of fiscal policy in the EU. At the 
same time, as a part of its mandate to make suggestions for the future evolution of the fiscal frame-
work, the EFB has a legal basis to reflect on the appropriateness of the relative importance assigned 
to fiscal sustainability and countercyclical considerations in the Stability and Growth Pact.
Analyses of the interplay between the fiscal stance and fiscal sustainability are, however, ana-
lytically challenging and raise many questions for which no consensus exists. In combination with 
the resource constraints of the EFB (see below), this constitutes a major problem.
Regardless of how board members interpret their mandate concerning assessments of national 
and eurozone fiscal stances, there is a clear danger that the EFB might get involved in discussions 
about fiscal stances without a solid analytical foundation. This could damage its reputation and 
the Board might easily be dragged into ideological debates between demandand supply-side views.
The task to cooperate with national fiscal councils (aiming at “exchanging best practices and 
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facilitating common understanding on matters related to the Unions fiscal framework”, Article 2) 
corresponds to its position on the European federal layer. Here, an interesting change in termi-
nology has occurred from the Five Presidents’ Report to the Commission Decision. The Report 
announced the Board to “coordinate” the network of national fiscal councils, which the Commis-
sion Decision has changed to “cooperate with”. This change serves as a response to concerns 
about a threatening European (Commission) intervention in the work of national councils and 
their independent assessment. 
Resources
Financial and human EFB resources are limited: The chair and the members are expected to 
dedicate not more than 20 and 10 full working days a year respectively to their role on the Board.¹² 
The members of the EFB are supported by a secretariat with a staff of six persons seconded from 
the Commission staff but who take instructions only from the Board. In comparison, the top third 
of the national boards in Europe (excluding the Dutch Central Planning Bureau) have on average 
20 employees and have an annual budget of 2-2.5 million Euros at their disposal.
This relative scarcity of resources raises questions as to how the EFB can convincingly carry out its 
tasks. Given that the five academic members are the guarantors of institutional independence (and 
not the Commission staff in the secretariat) their limited availability is a key problem. Tasks like re-
lations with European institutions, national fiscal councils, the media and stakeholders are time 
consuming and seem unlikely to be feasible in such a straightjacket. Also, unless board members 
are willing to engage voluntarily with the EFB agenda beyond the daily remuneration set by their 
contract, there is a risk of EFB output bearing the fingerprints of EFB staff rather than board mem-
bers. This can be seen as detrimental if the EFB’s analytical and secretarial staff are not perceived 
to act independently from the Commission (e.g., because of career ambitions within the Commis-
sion). In addition to the physical capacity of staff to scrutinise Commission decisions, there is thus 
also a question of culture and incentives to criticise the EU fiscal framework and its implementation.
Relationship with the legislature
The Board is accountable to the Commission, not to the Council or the Parliament. For national coun-
cils, well-defined relations with the legislature are crucial. An integration of council expertise in par-
liamentary budgetary procedures clearly fosters their impact. However, in this regard, best practices 
from national councils cannot be simply transferred to the EFB which has no mandate to monitor 
EU budgetary decisions made in the European Parliament. Nevertheless, a firm link to both the 
Council and the European Parliament is desirable. The Council, alongside the Commission, is a cru-
cial player in the European fiscal framework so it is important that the EFB‘s views are also directly 
communicated to the Council. And the Parliament, in its hearings, could offer a prominent platform 
to the EFB and thus strengthen the Board’s emancipation from the Commission.
Access to information
According to Article 5 of the Commission Decision the practical modalities for access to 
relevant information are laid down in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between 
the Board and the Commission. Practical experience gained in the first months of the EFB’s 
operations will show whether information flows are sufficient. In this respect, the integration of 
the Board’s secretary into the Commission, which is problematic in terms of its independence, 
could be beneficial. It must be stressed that the resource constraints also imply an information 
constraint. If the EFB lacks the capacity to replicate the Commission’s analyses and to experiment 
with new ones (e.g. on output gap estimations) this amounts to a fundamental information 
problem.
12  See call for expressions of interest for the selection of the members of the European Fiscal Board Official Journal (European Commission, 2016b).
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Transparency
On transparency, the Commission Decision is brief, only requiring (Article 6) the publication of 
an annual report. No precise date is indicated, meaning that the Board has leeway in this regard. 
While integrating the EFB work in the already overcrowded European Semester would seem desi-
rable, it is hard to see how the EFB could overcome its resource constraints to provide timely and 
effective communication.
Full transparency provides the greatest protection of independence and credibility for fiscal coun-
cils. The EFB was set up as an advisory body and the Commission Decision implicitly assumes 
that the EC will be the main recipient of the Board´s analyses and recommendations. It is not en-
tirely clear at this stage whether all reports of the EFB will be publicly available or just a subset 
of them. The OECD Principles also stress that fiscal councils should release their reports and ana-
lysis in their own name. Since the EFB is not a standalone institution with a clear identity (logo, 
website, etc.), publishing reports under the Commission´s logo might create confusion and im-
pair the effectiveness of communication of the most important messages.
Communications
As a new institution, the EFB has the natural handicap of low public awareness in the beginning. 
While generally older and more experienced boards tend to have a stronger public reputation 
(such as the Dutch CPB established in 1945), several recent cases have been very successful and 
quick to establish a reputation (such as the fiscal council of Portugal established in 2012). Such 
success, however, may also be conditional on the initial design of a board. Here, some concerns 
are warranted with respect to the contents of the Commission Decision defining the EFB. One pu-
blic annual report is definitely insufficient to establish broad public awareness. Moreover, the 
Article 2 statement, that on “the request of the President, the Board shall provide ad-hoc advice” 
could be understood as the Board not being able to produce (and immediately publish) analyses 
at its own initiative. The European Central Bank (2015) reads these regulations as if the EFB were 
not given the right to provide assessments of Commission decisions in real-time and would be 
constrained to the annual publication. If this interpretation prevails and is applied, the impact of 
the Board on the public debate will likely be negligible.
External evaluation
So far, nothing is known about any plans for external evaluation of the EFB’s analytical work.
Table 2: EFB vs Principles for independent fiscal institutions (OECD)
Principle EFB Evaluation
Local ownership Consensual proposal in the Five Presidents’ Report +
Independence and 
non-partisanship
Decision of the EC. Selection process by the EC.  
Staff from the EC. Part-time positions.
-
Mandate Mandate embedded only in a Commission´s decision. Contrast 
between “fiscal stance” and SGP-framework is problematic.
-
Resources Significantly under-resourced compared to the mandate. -
Relationship with the 
legislature
No links to Council or European Parliament. -
Access to  
information
Access to information directly via Commission.  
Scarcity of resources a handicap for information as well.
+/-
Transparency Question marks over full disclosure of information.  
Not a standalone institution with clear identity.
-
Communications Open communication is expected. Not yet clear how regularly. 
Noise to signal problem – “on request problem”.
+/-
External evaluation Not planned yet. -
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Table 2 summarises our assessment. The overall conclusion is that the EFB – compared to 
features of strong national councils – is rather weak. A lot depends, of course, on the actual im-
plementation of the Board, which is still to be developed with further possible adjustments and 
corrections. In Section 5 we summarise suggestions for that avenue.
4.3 Towards a European System of Fiscal Councils
The presence of the Network of EU IFIs is an opportunity for more efficient communication bet-
ween the EFB and national councils. Moreover, strong common positions of national councils 
communicated via the network would also mitigate the problem of a potential loss of perceived 
independence due to direct interference from Brussels.
As explained in Research Note 6.3, there are important arguments as to why cooperation between 
the EFB and local fiscal councils would be beneficial for all parties involved. On the one hand, 
the EFB might use the output of a local IFI when judging individual country circumstances and 
measures. There are at least three important areas where local IFIs can have a significant compa-
rative advantage: the calculation of structural budget balances, the costing of discretionary mea-
sures and the identification of ex-ante risks in draft budgets (especially on the expenditure side, 
including creative accounting techniques). Local fiscal councils might also benefit from the pre-
sence of a eurozone fiscal watchdog. Firstly, the EFB might be an important additional channel 
(besides the Network of EU IFIs) to amplify the messages of local fiscal councils. Secondly, by en-
suring horizontal consistency, the EFB might help to strengthen the position of the most vulne-
rable national councils in Europe. In this regard, a definition of minimum standards for national 
fiscal councils might be beneficial.
Box 2   A European System of Fiscal Councils:  
Rationale an Architecture 
As discussed in the main text, the lack of ex-ante coordination among independent fiscal insti-
tutions at the national and supranational level creates a risk of cacophony which would under-
mine the signalling role that these non-partisan players are expected to provide. For instance, 
confusion could stem from contrasting assessments of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts 
if the Commission and the national fiscal councils do not communicate in sync and/or use diver-
gent methodologies. Recommendations made by certain national fiscal councils could also con-
flict with the country-specific recommendations put forward by the European Council at the end 
of the European semester.
Establishing clear lines of communication among national fiscal councils, and between them and 
the Commission is a key step towards avoiding confusion. On an EU-wide level, a formal club such 
as the Network of EU Independent Fiscal Institutions can help disseminate good working 
practices, harmonise standards, and provide a forum for policy dialogue and peer reviews. Such 
dialogue can produce beneficial peer pressure (Calmfors and Wren-Lewis, 2011), further cement 
the independence of each council from national and EU-wide politics, and raise awareness on 
cross-border fiscal spillovers. The network can also be useful in identifying common problems 
experienced in the implementation of budgetary surveillance and bring it to the Commission’s 
attention. 
Between the EU level and the member states, regular exchange of information is essential. While 
the Commission should routinely update national fiscal councils on its evolving approach to and 
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practice of budgetary surveillance, national fiscal councils could keep the Commission abreast of 
country specificities requiring special attention in the implementation of the EU fiscal framework.
By design, the EFB is expected to play a role in fostering such vertical coordination, and it is 
ideally placed to do so if it can avoid the perception of being a channel of influence of the supra-
national authority on national fiscal councils. The Board could then envisage making efficient use 
of the existing EU network, possibly through signing a memorandum of understanding on 
information exchange which could lead to deeper forms of cooperation. Ultimately, the EFB to-
gether with a network of national fiscal councils could form a fiscal variant of the European 
System of Central Banks. 
5. The Way Forward
The EFB can potentially make a substantial contribution as a critical check on a Commission which, 
as a political entity, may be biased in its budgetary surveillance and cannot be regarded as an 
independent guardian of the fiscal soundness enshrined in the EU fiscal framework. However, 
this analysis has discussed potential weaknesses of the new institution. These weaknesses can 
and should be addressed. Overall, the early phase of the EFB will be crucial in this respect when 
the Board establishes its analytical credentials, communication with the public and cooperation 
with national fiscal councils. Based on our discussion above, we have formulated the following 
eight recommendations:
1.  Operational independence: The integration of the EFB’s secretariat into the Commission is the 
major flaw of the new institution. This architecture undermines the credibility of the Board as 
an independent advisor and reduces its potential as a counter-weight against the politicised 
application of European fiscal rules. Therefore, this set-up should be considered an interim 
arrangement that should quickly morph into a more robust body fully in line with good inter-
national practice. In particular, organisational and financial independence and full freedom 
of the Board in staff selection are indispensable requirements for any truly independent fiscal 
institution. For the time being, the Board should dispel the perception of any influence from 
the Commission on its activities. For instance, the Commission Decision envisages different 
types of staff including seconded national experts. A stronger role for the latter or possibly 
new recruits might help reduce dependence on staff with future career considerations within 
the Commission. 
2.  Rules versus discretion in countercyclical policy: The mandate as defined in the Commission 
Communication must be taken as given for the time being. However, the EFB could and should 
develop a way to deal with the tension and possible conflicts between compliance with the 
existing rules and its views on possible future modifications of the EU framework to provide 
a  more distinct role for fiscal stance considerations.
  It should declare full material compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact as the guiding 
principle for its recommendations and avoid making statements on discretionary (i.e. those 
not embedded in the current legal text of the Stability and Growth Pact) fiscal stance-related 
actions. The Board’s purpose should distance itself from the Commission’s (and the Council’s) 
generous considerations of economic and political trade-offs in their implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. It should thus avoid providing new creative interpretations of EU 
and international law on fiscal policy in EU member states. Any such messages would seri-
ously damage the Board’s reputation, the potential added value of its existence for Europe’s 
fiscal credibility and indeed further damage the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
At the same time, there is a potentially important role for the EFB to play in making suggesti-
ons on how to move towards a simpler, more transparent EU fiscal framework. As a part of this 
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agenda, it could provide an assessment of the relative weight of countercyclical considera-
tions in such a future framework based on sound analytical work. However, communication 
of such suggestions should be kept distinct from statements on the application of the current 
rules.
3.  Cooperation with national councils: Cooperation with national councils should aim at facili-
tating a free, two-way flow of information between national councils and the Commission. In 
this respect, a close exchange on methodological standards and data could be to the mutual 
benefit of European and national councils. However, the EFB should avoid any initiatives which 
could be misunderstood as a European interference with autonomous national institutions 
since this would threaten local ownership and reputation.
4.  Communication: On public awareness, it is up to the EFB itself to come up with a comprehen-
sive and proactive communication strategy. Such proactive communication was the intention 
for this new institution in the Five Presidents’ Report which stated that the Board “should be 
able to issue opinions when it considers it necessary, including in particular in connection 
with the assessment of Stability Programmes and presentation of the annual Draft Budgetary 
Plans and the execution of national budgets” (Juncker et al. 2015, Annex 3). Therefore, any 
narrow interpretation of the Board’s legal basis (if this prohibited real time public statements 
at sub-annual frequency and on the Board’s own initiative) must be firmly rejected. The Board 
should, from the beginning, demonstrate that its communication strategy is autonomously 
decided. If Articles 2 (“on request”) and Article 6 (“annual report”) really raise questions about 
any legal restriction on such an independent communication strategy then the Commission 
Decision urgently needs to be clarified and amended. An EFB publicity strategy limited to an 
annual report on (outdated) considerations and recommendations would render the whole 
institutional innovation practically worthless. The Board should develop a calendar for its pu-
blic statements which is meaningfully connected to crucial dates within the European Semes-
ter. In addition, it should come up with ad hoc press statements in close proximity to Commis-
sion Decisions. The real-time nature of its public statements is a necessary precondition for 
any impact on media debates. Moreover, the Board should establish a firm relationship with 
the European Parliament and use hearings as another occasion to make its messages public. 
5.  “Comply or explain” principle: The Five Presidents’ Report had stressed the “comply or exp-
lain” principle as an obligation for the Commission’s reaction to Board statements: the Com-
mission “should be able to deviate from the views of the European Fiscal Board provided that 
it has justifiable reasons and explains them” (Juncker et al. 2015, Annex 3). Hence, the Board 
should insist on careful answers from the Commission, in particular in those cases where the-
re is disagreement between the Board and the Commission. 
6.  Resources: Resources, in particular the working hours of the five board members, must be re-
viewed. It is highly implausible that the current number of working hours set aside in the mem-
ber contracts is sufficient. The issue is of particular importance because it is the members who 
defend the Board’s independence from the Commission, not the staff. There is also a risk that 
the Board might try to externalise its resource constraints by imposing extensive reporting re-
quirements on national boards. This must be avoided since this could add to resource cons-
traints which sometimes exist for national fiscal councils.
7.  Deeper integration with the European fiscal framework: To limit political influence on the ap-
plication of European fiscal rules as much as possible, the EFB can be given more significance 
in the following areas. Firstly, the EFB can be given the task of triggering escape clauses. 
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Secondly, the EFB could provide (in cooperation with national fiscal councils) a “second opi-
nion” on hard-to-measure (uncertain) inputs such as output gaps, structural budget balances, 
discretionary revenue measures or impacts of structural reforms. Thirdly, the EFB can also be 
included in the evaluation of fiscal adjustment programs financed by the ESM. Fourthly, the 
EFB can produce regular reports of compliance with the Directive on national fiscal frameworks 
or the Fiscal Compact. Functional medium-term budgetary frameworks, automatic correction 
mechanisms and the application of the comply-or-explain principle are especially important 
in this regard. The main findings would be included in the country specific recommendations 
(CSRs).
  These additional mandates, however, stand in stark contrast with the limited availability of 
EFB’s initial staff and other resources. Therefore, if desirable, these suggestions can be view-
ed in the context of an evolutionary tale for the current “interim” board.
8.  Potential role with respect to EU budget: Finally, one longer-term reform question concerns 
the potential role of the EFB as a watchdog over budgetary decisions made by the EU itself. 
The budgetary system of the EU is in a constant flux. Although there is no general competen-
cy to deficit-finance the European budget, issues of contingent liabilities and offbudget acti-
vities have become increasingly relevant in the context of efforts to rescue the euro, the in-
vestment initiative or migration policies. Just as in the national budgetary context, a truly 
independent council could also improve public information on fiscal risks at the European 
level. The respective role of the EFB should be discussed in the context of the beginning of a 
period of reflection for the next Multiannual Financial Framework.
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6. Research Notes
6.1 Do fiscal councils make fiscal rules more effective?   By Mustafa Yeter¹³
–   Introduction: Reforming fiscal institutions aimed at promoting sound fiscal policies ranked 
high on the political agenda in response to the economic crisis. To this end, the establishment 
of independent fiscal councils monitoring fiscal policy at the national level and ensuring its 
accordance with long-term fiscal targets was among the main proposals, especially in Europe. 
The motivation for proposing fiscal councils is an attempt to recreate the success of indepen-
dent monetary boards in the fiscal sphere. By forming a non-partisan institution which acts 
as a fiscal watchdog monitoring government activity, proposing (alternative) policy recom-
mendations, and stimulating the public debate by providing more transparency, fiscal coun-
cils are expected to represent a further tool against the debt bias of politicians (e.g., Calmfors 
and Wren-Lewis, 2011).
  In this paper, I test empirically whether fiscal councils can contribute to more sustainable fis-
cal policy by strengthening fiscal rules and increasing their efficacy. This requires taking into 
account the potential endogeneity of fiscal councils. The latter might be driven by unobserved 
fiscal preferences or the unobserved competence of politicians (Beetsma and Debrun, 2016). 
Neglecting these potential sources of endogeneity would result in a significant bias which 
would invalidate obtained results (Heinemann, Moessinger and Yeter, forthcoming).
  To this end, I will make two distinct contributions to the literature on fiscal councils in this pa-
per. Firstly, I will assemble a panel data set on fiscal councils providing information over time 
with respect to changes in the mandate of national fiscal councils. Secondly, I will rely on pro-
pensity score matching, matching differences-in-differences, and the synthetic control method 
in order to obtain causal inference.
–  Data: Cross-sectional information on fiscal councils is provided by both the International Mo-
netary Fund (IMF) as well as the European Commission (e.g., Debrun and Kinda, 2014). While 
using the information on the year of foundation may allow me to transform the data into a pa-
nel structure mechanically, this would assume that there were no changes in the mandate of 
fiscal councils over time. However, some councils such as the CPB Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis or the Danish Economic Council date back to the 1940s or the 1960s 
respectively, so assuming no changes in the mandate would lead to a serious measurement 
error. Using the IMF data set as a baseline, I therefore extend the data and code changes over 
time with respect to the mandate to monitor national fiscal rules. To this end, I rely on OECD 
country notes, legal texts, and internet research on the official web pages of fiscal councils 
(OECD, 2012, 2015). Overall, my sample contains panel information on fiscal councils in 33 
countries.
  Information on the presence of fiscal rules and their de jure strength is obtained from the IMF 
(Schaechter et al., 2012). Fiscal data on the cyclically adjusted primary balance, gross debt 
relative to GDP and GDP per capita as well as long-run government bond yields is obtained 
from several IMF and OECD sources as well the European Commission. Political controls with 
respect to the possibility of plebiscites, the right of the executive government to dissolve the 
legislature, and the right of the legislature to question the executive government are obtained 
from the database Varieties of Democracy. My analysis further includes proxies for fractiona-
13  ZEW Mannheim and University of Goettingen, Contact address: P.O. Box 103443, 68034 Mannheim, Germany.  
E-mail: yeter@zew.de
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lisation, information on the ideology of the executive government as well as the legal origin 
of a country (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008). The final unbalanced sam-
ple covers 46 countries including EU28, OECD member states and exhibits varying time 
coverage within 1970–2015. 
–  Methodology: As documented in Heinemann, Moessinger and Yeter (forthcoming), neglecting 
or only dealing insufficiently with the potential endogeneity of fiscal rules and fiscal councils 
invalidates the results of the empirical analysis. Ideally, one would like to observe fiscal out-
comes in both states, namely with and without rules or councils in place. Since this is not 
feasible, it is necessary to account formally for the (self-) selection into treatment observed 
from the countries included in the sample.
  In the first approach, I rely on propensity score matching using different matching algorithms. 
To match proper control units to the treated countries in my sample, I draw on a wide range of 
fiscal and political control variables which are likely to drive the presence and the individual 
mandate of fiscal councils. In an ideal world, the political controls would serve as a functional 
oversight for the executive government on their own. However, the degree of failure of these 
institutions in exerting an effective oversight is a likely driving factor for the presence of a 
fiscal council which then serves as a substitute.
  The estimation of propensity scores must result in balance between treated and non-treated 
observations in the sample with respect to the above mentioned control variables to ensure 
the validity of the approach as such. Figure 6.1 documents that this balancing is properly 
achieved and further indicates a strong bias if the (self-) selection into treatment is not taken 
into account. As an extension, I implement a matching differences-in-differences approach 
which allows me to control for counterfactual trends by combining the matching methodology 
with a differences-in-differences framework.
  Given the large heterogeneity in the design, mandate, and experience of individual fiscal coun-
cils, I rely on a second formal approach which allows me to obtain causal inference and 
testing for the effects of fiscal councils on a country-by-country basis. The synthetic control 
method combines case study and regression designs. In this case, control groups are obtai-
ned by estimating linear combinations of non-treated countries which match the pre-treatment 
development of the respective treated country as closely as possible and serve as a synthetic 
control group.
Figure 6.1  Balancing property of the propensity score matching
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Results: The supporting effect of fiscal councils monitoring fiscal rules is tested for both the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance which captures discretionary fiscal policy decisions and long-
term government bond yield spreads which capture the response of fiscal markets. Table 6.1. 
provides the results using propensity score matching with stratification, nearest neighbour and 
kernel matching algorithms. While the top and middle part of the table documents the results for 
the cyclically adjusted primary balance, the bottom part provides the results for the bond yield 
spreads.
On average, I do not find evidence for an improvement of the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
if a fiscal rule is supported by a fiscal council whose mandate involves the monitoring of the 
former. The results are not altered if I account explicitly for the de jure strength of the fiscal rule 
in place. This pattern changes, however, when I test the impact of fiscal councils on the long-term 
government bond yield spread relative to Switzerland. In this case, fiscal councils contribute on 
average to a further reduction of risk premiums faced by countries.
Table 6.1: Results using propensity score matching
Stratification
Nearest 
Neighbour
Kernel
Epanechnikov
Kernel
Gaussian
Average treatment on the treated
Monitoring
0.200
[0.484]
{0.413}
1.017
[0.940]
{1.080}
0.286
[0.476]
{0.600}
0.461
[0.418]
{1.100}
Rule-index
0.573
[0.400]
{1.194}
0.851
[0.629]
{1.35}
0.628
[0.467]
{1.340}
0.701
[0.399]
{1.760}
Spreads
-0.509
[0.189]
{-2.695}
-0.643
[0.220]
{-2.920}
-0.525
[0.166]
{-3.150}
-0.561
[0.151]
{-3.700}
# of treated 
observations
70 70 70 70
# of treated 
observations
1.022 62 1.022 1.022
Table 6.2: Results using radius matching
Radius matching
0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.005 0.01 0.05 0.1
Average treatment on the treated
Monitoring
0.351
[0.933]
{0.377}
0.106
[0.470]
{0.226}
0.226
[0.425]
{0.531}
0.230
[0.291]
{0.790}
0.219
[0.270]
{0.813}
0.506
[0.231]
{2.190}
0.602
[0.225]
{2.681}
Spreads
-0.507
[0.479]
{-1.060}
-0.500
[0.318]
{-1.570}
-0.522
[0.313]
{-1.670}
-0.464
[0.209]
{-2.220}
-0.454
[0.184]
{-2.460}
-0.521
[0.166]
{-3.130}
-0.543
[0.151]
{-3.580}
# of treated 
observations
24 50 54 66 66 70 70
# of treated 
observations
32 120 198 462 557 1.020 1.022
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Table 6.2. provides the results using propensity score matching in combination with a radius mat-
ching algorithm. The columns of the table alter the maximum difference in propensity scores for 
observations to be considered as control units. Consequently, an increasing radius reduces the 
demands with respect to the similarity between treated and non-treated units in relative terms. 
The results in the case of radius matching confirm the previous pattern in which no or a non-ro-
bust impact is found on the cyclically adjusted primary balance but is found on the bond yield 
spreads.
The lack of a statistically significant impact of fiscal councils on the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance on average is further documented by the results using the synthetic control group 
method. Figure 6.2 provides the results for Germany and Sweden as a showcase. The dashed 
vertical line indicates the respective point in time of treatment and the light grey lines provide 
results for placebo tests. While the evidence for Sweden points towards a positive impact of 
fiscal councils, a similar result is not observed in the case of Germany. Running the analysis for 
further countries in my sample yields a majority of cases without a measurable impact on the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Overall, my analysis therefore does not document an addi-
tional impact of fiscal councils on fiscal fundamentals such as the primary balance. The analysis 
does, however, provide evidence for a reward in terms of reduced risk premiums from financial 
markets.
Figure 6.2  Synthetic control group analysis
   
6.2 Are fiscal multiplier estimates biased?  By Zareh Asatryan
Introduction: Fiscal multiplier estimates are an important input for policy design: they measure 
the short-term impact of discretionary fiscal policy on output. Multipliers are typically defined as 
the ratio of a change in output at a particular horizon as a response to an exogenous change in 
fiscal policy (see, e.g., Batini et. al. 2014). 
However, existing estimates range widely for objective reasons. For example, they may differ ac-
ross policy instruments (e.g., spending or taxes), time-horizons, business cycles, monetary en-
vironments, geography, etc. A meta-analysis of 104 scholarly papers by Gechert (2015) reveals 
a wide distribution of multipliers which range from -0.19 to 2.27, respectively, at the bottom and 
top 5 percentiles of the distribution. Figure 6.3 plots the distribution of multipliers separately for 
general spending, tax reliefs, public investment, and transfers. The means (standard deviations) 
of these four variables are 0.98(069), 0.46(0.57), 1.34(0.79), and 0.47(0.46), respectively.
−20
−10
0
10
20
Ga
p 
in
 c
yc
lic
al
ly
 a
dj
us
te
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
ba
la
nc
e
2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Placebo test
Germany
Ga
p 
in
 c
yc
lic
al
ly
 a
dj
us
te
d 
pr
im
ar
y 
ba
la
nc
e
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Placebo test
Sweden
10
0
–10
–20
24 | ZEWpolicybrief ZEWpolicybrief | 3 policy brief 
Figure 6.3   Distribution of fiscal multipliers on spending and taxes (left), and investment and 
transfers (right)
  
Notes: The histograms exclude outliers outside the interval of [-1.7, 3.4] which is three times the standard deviation 
around the mean value of 0.87 of the total sample. The sample includes 2,283 observations of which 33 are dropped.
In addition to such objective reasons behind having diverse multipliers, there exist at least two 
further motives for why multipliers may be biased due to more subjective reasons. Firstly, being 
a simple parameter of interest, multipliers are popularly debated and are often politicised. This 
may lead the researcher to arrive at a “preferred” multiplier estimate by cherry picking the 
method, the identification strategy, the data and the context, among other variables of choice. 
Secondly, as put forward by Kirchgässner (2014), “there is quite a lot of consensus with respect 
to microeconomic questions, but much less with respect to macroeconomic or macro policy ques-
tions.” Because macro debates often lack solution due to absence of clear causal inference 
there is more room for manipulation and ideology.
–  Data: In this note, we match data on 2,283 fiscal multipliers estimated by 173 authors in the 
period 1992 - 2012 to author-specific characteristics. The central question we ask is whether 
authors’ personal characteristics correlate with their estimated multipliers.
  More specifically, we exploit information from the authors’ CVs and assign them to countries 
(and years) where the authors were either working when publishing the results, or received 
their highest degree of education. We then take the government spending-to-GDP ratio of each 
country-year observation¹⁴  to proxy for each author’s preferences towards the size of the 
government. 
–  Results: Our baseline expectation is that the environment, i.e. the country of work or educa-
tion, where an author works should have no correlation with his or her multiplier estimate.
 
  Figure 6.4 plots the correlation between multiplier estimates (y-axis) and the government 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio at country of origin (x-axis). We find a positive and statistically sig-
nificant correlation with a slope (standard error) of 1.251 (0.254) and 1.429 (0.265) for the 
left and right sub-figures, respectively.
14  Sample of countries includes: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
 Singapore, Sweden, and the USA. In this sample the government spending-to-GDP ratio varies between 0.22 (Singapore) and 0.65 (Ireland).
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Figure 6.4  Fiscal multipliers and government expenditure at country of origin
Notes: Each dot shows the average fiscal multiplier (y-axis) for a given level of government expenditure as a ratio of GDP 
(x-axis), holding the controls constant. Country of origin is measured as the country of work or the country of education in 
the left and right figure, respectively. For both binned scatterplots we control for the underlying multiplier type, the 
employed model approach, and other relevant aspects (see table A2.2 below). This is achieved by residualizing the x and 
y variable on these controls before plotting them and obtaining the regression fit (partitioned regression). We then group 
the residualised x-variable into 50 bins with equal number of observations (2.22% of the sample) and compute the mean 
of the x and y variable residuals within each bin. As before, we exclude outliers outside the interval [-1.7, 3.4]. The fitted 
line is an OLS regression based on the underlying data (not the specified bins) and controlling for the above factors.
Table 6.4 presents our regression results. The dependent variable is the fiscal multiplier estimate. 
In columns 1-3 and 4-6 the main dependent variable of interest is the government spending-to-
GDP ratio of country of work and education, respectively. In all regressions we control for 
important study properties, such as the multiplier-type, time-horizon, number of authors, and 
publication-status. Since a researcher may affect the results by “manipulating” the important 
properties of the study such as its method (e.g., RBC, DSGE, VAR, etc.), we estimate models first 
without controlling for the method to quantify the total potential bias (columns 1 and 4), and then 
by including such controls. In columns 3 and 6 we additionally control for country fixed effects 
(not reported). We cluster the standard errors at the level of papers.
Our preliminary results of Figure 6.4 and Table 6.4 are consistent with the hypothesis that 
authors’ preferences regarding the size of the government (as measured by the level of govern-
ment expenditure at country of origin) correlate with the size of the estimated multipliers. The 
size of the effect is fairly large: A 10 percentage point increase in spending-to-GDP ratio increases 
the fiscal multiplier by 0.11 to 0.21 points on average (or by 13 to 25% of the mean).
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Table 6.4 - Effect of fiscal preferences on estimated fiscal multipliers
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expenditure/GDP (workplace)
1.951***
(0.718)
1.251*
(0.644)
 2.161*
(1.135)
Expenditure/GDP (education) 
 
2.037***
(0.601)
1.429**
(0.547)
1.132**
(0.498)
RBC  
-0.514***
(0.187)
-0.478***
(0.146)
 
-0.534***
(0.202)
-0.463***
(0.143)
DSGE_NK  
-0.0761
(0.0807)
-0.0821
(0.0856)
 
-0.0765
(0.0807)
-0.0541
(0.0877)
MACRO  
0.181**
(0.0843)
0.264***
(0.0694)
 
0.133
(0.0872)
0.241***
(0.0721)
Single Equation
Estimation 
Model
 
-0.165
(0.168)
-0.210
(0.169)
 
-0.154
(0.172)
-0.166
(0.171)
SPEND
0.0422
(0.0799)
0.0642
(0.0792)
0.0797
(0.0801)
0.0142
(0.0884)
0.0464
(0.0847)
0.0642
(0.0829)
INVEST
0.465***
(0.166)
0.505***
(0.153)
0.441***
(0.147)
0.459**
(0.192)
0.509***
(0.174)
0.463***
(0.159)
MILIT
0.178
(0.240)
0.219
(0.245)
0.116
(0.224)
0.160
(0.253)
0.203
(0.253)
0.144
(0.232)
TAX
-0.396***
(0.117)
-0.390***
(0.120)
-0.358***
(0.131)
-0.395***
(0.124)
-0.385***
(0.127)
-0.354**
(0.139)
TRANS
-0.438***
(0.107)
-0.408***
(0.109)
-0.453***
(0.107)
-0.403***
(0.115)
-0.357***
(0.122)
-0.403***
(0.112)
EMPLOY
0.0852
(0.146)
0.128
(0.142)
0.232*
(0.124)
0.205
(0.160)
0.206
(0.155)
0.251*
(0.132)
DEF
-0.399***
(0.126)
-0.311**
(0.152)
-0.321**
(0.160)
-0.422***
(0.139)
-0.338**
(0.163)
-0.331**
(0.167)
PEAK
0.00598
(0.113)
0.0474
(0.123)
0.104
(0.118)
-0.0369
(0.121)
0.0137
(0.128)
0.0897
(0.126)
HORIZON
-0.0971
(0.117)
-0.104
(0.122)
-0.00994
(0.112)
-0.200*
(0.108)
-0.191*
(0.114)
-0.0686
(0.106)
HORIZON²
0.0465
(0.0343)
0.0490
(0.0346)
0.0223
(0.0301)
0.0738**
(0.0322)
0.0720**
(0.0326)
0.0394
(0.0280)
PEAK*HOR
0.159
(0.173)
0.0469
(0.191)
-0.0695
(0.166)
0.247
(0.176)
0.135
(0.194)
-0.0432
(0.161)
PEAK*HOR²
0.00237
(0.0604)
0.0256
(0.0638)
0.0651
(0.0552)
-0.0229
(0.0608)
-0.00129
(0.0648)
0.0603
(0.0522)
M/GDP (in %)
(country 
sample)
-0.0129***
(0.00325)
-0.0142***
(0.00315)
-0.0163***
(0.00313)
-0.0111***
(0.00352)
-0.0133***
(0.00326)
-0.0171***
(0.00333)
Dummy = 1 if journal article
0.0560
(0.0752)
0.0460
(0.0723)
0.0637
(0.0766)
0.115
(0.0840)
0.0927
(0.0833)
0.0750
(0.0854)
Dummy = 1 if single author
0.0155
(0.117)
-0.00177
(0.118)
0.0322
(0.121)
0.0409
(0.127)
0.000364
(0.134)
0.000674
(0.139)
Constant
0.218
(0.353)
0.599*
(0.319)
-0.0142
(0.581)
0.204
(0.312)
0.553**
(0.274)
0.568*
(0.291)
Observations 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,014 2,014 2,014
R-squared 0.255 0.285 0.342 0.253 0.285 0.344
Country fixed effects X X
Notes: The level of observation is author-multiplier. Standard errors are clustered by paper.
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6.3 Exploiting synergies between fiscal rules  
  and fiscal councils in the EU        By Ľudovít Ódor 
Introduction: A proper fiscal framework should ensure long-term sustainability while avoiding 
pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour. The framework in the eurozone failed on both fronts. In good times, 
just before the crisis hit, it did not promote the creation of sufficient fiscal space; in bad times it 
was too restrictive to stabilise the economy. This note argues that a fundamental redefinition of 
accountability between the central and national authorities – based on the subsidiarity principle 
– is necessary to make the common currency more resilient. Europe needs a decentralised and 
depoliticised fiscal framework, where synergies between smart fiscal rules and independent fis-
cal institutions are exploited, both at the national and European level.
Maze or pyramid? Several issues have to be taking into consideration when reforming the fiscal 
framework in Europe. Firstly, it is necessary to better align theory and the actual design of fiscal 
rules and institutions. The fundamental conflict between using one-size-fits-all approaches and 
at the same taking into account country specificities has often led to reliance on escape clauses, 
special regimes and “other factors”. As a result, Europe ended up with a complex web of some-
times contradicting rules and procedures (Ódor, 2014). Paradoxically, the system is relying on so 
many rules, that the final verdict is in fact in many cases a discretionary decision by the European 
Commission/Council. 
Secondly, the division of labour between the community and national level is blurred. There is no 
clear separation of accountability and responsibility. The European framework combines a non-
credible no bail-out principle, sovereignty of Member States in budgetary issues, the SGP and 
rescue funds such as the ESM or EFSF. It is necessary to define when and under what conditions 
an intervention from the centre is warranted. It is also important to limit political influence in the 
application of rules and procedures as much as possible. 
Thirdly, current fiscal indicators allow fiscal gimmickry, and real time evaluation of structural bud-
get balances is more art than science. More appropriate methodological tools are available in the 
literature, but their application is often hampered by the current institutional set-up.
The solution to these three fundamental problems we propose in Ódor and P. Kiss (2017)¹⁵ is 
similar to the arrangement advocated by Wren-Lewis (2003). The first line of defence against 
irresponsible fiscal policy behaviour should be at the local level, using home-grown fiscal rules 
and independent fiscal institutions. The community level in our proposal is represented not only 
by the European Commission, but also by an independent fiscal watchdog for the eurozone. 
These institutions should in our view focus primarily on avoiding free-riding and procyclicality at 
level of the whole area and supervising countries breaching European limits. 
It is important to note that it is not possible to separate the issue of fiscal frameworks from the 
question of the overall set-up of a currency union. Therefore, at the bottom of Figure 6.5 we list 
two important pre-conditions to be met: a fully functional banking union and a stronger no 
bail-out principle. Even if the no bail out principle is unlikely to achieve full credibility, as is the 
case in the US (at least in the medium term), the more losses are absorbed by shareholders and 
creditors the easier the design of fiscal rules at the community level.
15  The first version of the paper appeared well before the decision of the Commission to set up the EFB.
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Figure 6.5 - Proposal for a new European fiscal framework
 
 
Separation of accountabilities: The problem of deficit bias in currency unions arises both at the 
local level and the level of the whole area (free-riding). The obvious approach would be to build 
a hierarchical system of responsibilities (as presented in Figure 6.5). When there is no sign of 
free-riding behaviour with potential contagion effects, the national level should be responsible 
for fighting against the local deficit bias. In that case, a country-specific, tailor-made solution 
should be designed (local indicators, rules and institutions).
Area level rules and institutions should primarily focus on problems concerning common inter-
est. High on this list is possible contagion, free-riding behaviour or, for example, counter-cyclical 
aggregate fiscal policy. If the eurozone is successful in putting in place clear rules for burden 
sharing, a banking union, and debt restructuring with a strong backstop mechanism, the current 
trend of legislating more and more complex fiscal rules can be reversed. 
The presence of EFW can make rules simpler: The most important argument in favour of a Euro-
area Fiscal Watchdog (EFW) is that currently there is too much political pressure on the European 
Commission to interpret fiscal rules in a flexible manner. This has also been recognised in the 
Five Presidents´ Report (Juncker et al., 2015).
In the proposal above, authorities at the European level would have three responsibilities: 
monitoring compliance with minimum standards defined for local fiscal frameworks, checking 
compliance with European fiscal rules and supervising countries over pre-agreed limits. 
As far as minimum standards are concerned, the EFW would carry out a yearly evaluation 
exercise. When deviations are observed, these should be reflected in country-specific recommen-
dations via the European Semester. In the case of serious non-compliance, there would be a 
possibility to ask the European Court of Justice to rule on the matter (as in the case of the Fiscal 
Compact). One very important task to fulfil would be the activation of escape clauses. Apart from 
that, the EFW should be in a position to issue direct recommendations to national authorities 
breaching European rules. Here the “comply or explain” principle would apply. In the most seri-
ous cases, the EFW would have the tools to recommend veto power over national budget plans.
Setting up an EFW: Based on international experience, a small council (up to 3-5 members) with 
a medium-sized secretariat seems to be the preferable alternative. The selection of council mem-
bers is also very important. One should strive for an optimal balance between academics and 
policy makers. Hands-on experience with budgets seems to be necessary as well. After selecting 
the management, the council should be free to hire and fire staff members. The number of staff 
would depend on the mandate (approximately 30-50 analysts).
In order to avoid duplicities and blurred responsibilities, two important sets of relationships 
should be clarified: vis-à-vis the European Commission and local fiscal councils. Since the EFW 
would function in this set-up as an independent analytical body only, major decision-making pro-
EFW
European fiscal rules
Minimum standards
Local fiscal councils
Local fiscal rules
Better indicators
Banking union 
Ex-ante sovereign resolution schemes
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cesses should remain in the hands of the European Commission. However, there would be no 
role for the EC with regards those Member States operating without gross policy errors. When 
pre-agreed limits are identified by the EFW, the EC should step in and issue recommendations. If 
these are not followed in the draft budget, ex-ante veto power would be exercised (based on the 
recommendation from the EFW). The EFW can be also part of the “troika” to judge sustainability 
of debt after measures are implemented. 
There are important arguments for why cooperation between the EFW and local fiscal councils 
would be beneficial for all parties involved. On the one hand, the EFW might use the output of a 
local IFI when judging individual country circumstances and measures. This way it is possible to 
abandon one-size-fits-all methodologies and to focus on best possible estimates/methodologies 
instead. In our view it is much better to use discretion in methodology than in the interpretation 
of fiscal rules (as is the case now). There are at least three important areas where local IFIs can 
have a significant comparative advantage: calculation of structural budget balances, costing 
discretionary measures and identifying ex-ante risks in draft budgets (especially on the expen-
diture side, including creative accounting techniques).
Local fiscal councils might also benefit from the presence of a eurozone fiscal watchdog. By eva-
luating minimum standards, the EFW would be a guardian of their independence. Moreover, by 
collecting international best practices and research output, cooperation with the EFW might also 
increase the quality of output from local IFIs. However, it should be noted that it is of utmost im-
portance that the independence of all councils involved are respected. Local fiscal councils should 
not be viewed as “branches” of the EFW, but rather home-grown, local institutions responsible 
for monitoring local fiscal rules. 
EFB vs. EFW: The European Commission decided to establish an independent advisory European 
Fiscal Board in October 2015. While the institutional set-up and mandate of the EFB has signifi-
cant overlaps with our proposal for the EFW, important differences prevail. 
Our proposal is consistent with a decentralised fiscal framework. On the other hand, the EFB was 
set up to operate within the current centralised framework following the current practices of the 
Commission by sharing the same legal background. Part time members of the board can defini-
tely play an important advisory role, but real-time evaluation of European fiscal trends is unlike-
ly with the limited resources. Institutionally the EFB is not independent. It was set up by the EC 
and is also financed by the Commission. Moreover, all five members of the board were nomina-
ted by the EC and its secretariat is composed of Commission employees.
Further Information
Prof. Dr. Friedrich Heinemann, Head of the Research Department Corporate Taxation and Public 
Finance, Phone: +49/621/1235-149, E-mail: heinemann@zew.de
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